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1. Introduction
According to a political economics view, the extent to which government
employees can acquire rents and protect them against dissipation is essentially
determined by the institutional environment. Institutions affect the account-
ability and responsiveness of ofﬁcials to citizens and interest groups and, thus,
determine the size of the rents created. Further, institutions inﬂuence the de-
gree of political control of public bureaucrats and, thus, the distribution of rents
within the public sphere.
In order to understand the restrictions to rent seeking of government sector
employees, direct measures of rents are desirable. Rents, or utility premiums of
government sector workers relative to private sector workers, can consist of
wage differentials, monetary fringe beneﬁts, nonmonetary job amenities, and
possibilities for extracting bribes. Approaches based on wage differentials can-
not capture all those beneﬁts, or are not applicable, because they start from
a competitive equilibrium without rents; they offer no guidance in interpreting
any wage differential, either in terms of a rent or compensation. Job queues
potentially capture the total rent, but only for the marginal position and if gov-
ernment jobs are not allocated by cronyism. Setting reported bureaucratic cor-
ruption equal to rents is not appropriate either because it is not clear whether
corruption leads to extra beneﬁts for public employees.
This article pursues two goals. (1) As a direct measure for bureaucratic rents,
we propose the difference in subjective well-being between public and private
sector employees of a country. If bureaucrats report higher life satisfaction,
this differential is interpreted as a utility premium, or simply a rent. It is argued
that employees in the government sector beneﬁt from higher rents in countries
where there is a larger positive gap in reported life satisfaction, ceteris paribus.
In contrast to previous approaches for measuring rents, our approach has the
advantage of measuring the total net utility differential between people work-
ing in the government and the private sector. (2) We analyze the conditions
determining the rents in the public bureaucracy in a cross section of 25
European and 17 Latin-American countries. The life satisfaction differentials
between privately and publicly employed people are related to institutional and
political factors that are proposed as effective controls, guaranteeing efﬁciency
in the government sector. In particular, we study empirically (1) political con-
trol when the interests of the legislature and the executive are aligned, (2) the
role of an independent judiciary, (3) the relation to speciﬁc policies, and (4)
whether rents are appropriated via corruption.
Section 2 sketches various theories explaining the existence of rents in the
government sector. Section 3 introduces our measure for capturing rents. Sec-
tion 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2. Theories of Bureaucratic Rents
Rent-seeking activities aim at securing private beneﬁts through state activities.
Though individually rational, rent seeking is socially wasteful. Investments in
the rent-seeking contest divert resources from their productive use, and the
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resulting regulations induce market distortions. Rent-seeking activities not
only affect the wealth distribution within the private sector but also are
expected to reduce the level of welfare in the private sector overall. Winners
of the rent-seeking contest and their employees might be better off, but the
unsuccessful contestants and the unorganized citizens lose. Rent-seeking ac-
tivities also lead to a redistribution between the private and the government
sector. We focus on this latter aspect of rent seeking. Investments in rent seek-
ing by interest groups can take the form of campaign contributions, hiring the
relatives of ofﬁcials, employing the ofﬁcials themselves upon retirement, or
bribes. Therefore, elected ofﬁcials and bureaucrats are beneﬁciaries of rent-
seeking activities.
Bureaucrats play an important role on the supply side of the political market
for rent-creating government interventions. On the one hand, bureaus have
substantial policy-implementing authority, making them a worthwhile target
for rent-seeking activities. On the other hand, the policies resulting from the
rent-seeking process, even if brokered by elected ofﬁcials, create valuable
property rights. Bureaucrats can extract part of the created rents, insofar as
they have discretion over the provision of these property rights. Rents of gov-
ernment employees thus depend (1) on the extent to which rents are transferred
from the private to the public sphere and (2) how they are shared between
politicians and the bureaucracy.
2.1 Political Checks and Balances
There are two opposing perspectives on how to best deal with the agency prob-
lems inherent in representative democratic governance. In a ﬁrst perspective,
separation of powers with competition between political institutions in a sys-
tem of checks and balances is assumed to make it more difﬁcult for politicians
to collude with each other at the voters’ expense. So politicians can extract less
rents, bureaucrats can share in (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Persson and
Tabellini 2004). A second perspective sees the remedy in electoral competition
between relatively few political parties in a centralized political system. Voters
makepoliticians responsible forgovernment servicesand relyon their clear lines
of authority vis-a`-vis the bureaucracy (Downs 1957; Olson 1982; Kunikova´
and Rose-Ackerman 2005).
How rents are shared depends on the political control of the bureaucracy by
the executive and the legislator. Politicians apply a wide set of strategies in-
cluding the competition for budgets among bureaus, ex post sanctions, and
enfranchising the politically relevant constituencies in the administrative pro-
cess which monitor bureaus’ behavior (Weingast andMoran 1983; McCubbins
et al. 1987; de Figueiredo et al. 1999). The form of democratic governance and
the political control of the bureaucracy including its organization and pro-
cesses are, however, interrelated (e.g., Moe and Caldwell 1994; Spiller and
Urbiztondo 1994). More or less competition between the legislature and
the executive provides speciﬁc incentives to politicians in their effort to design
an accountable bureaucracy in order to pursue their policy preferences (Lupia
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and McCubbins 1994). In the literature, the efforts of the executive and the
legislature to control the bureaucracy are often discussed referring to the dis-
tinction between a presidential and a parliamentary system. It is hypothesized
that the more the principals’ interests diverge, the easier it is for government
employees to acquire rents. Under separation of power with weak legislators,
bureaucrats are able to play politicians in the executive and legislative
branches off one another in the attempt to maximize their discretion. The ten-
dency of opposing interests between the executive branch and the legislator in
a presidential system fuels legislator’s activism to protect its interest in the
bureaucracy. Legislators impose detailed rules of procedure that are difﬁcult
to alter by the executive. Political control of the bureaucracy, however, is
thereby hampered. Thus, although the separation of power in a presidential
system might reduce the total rents in the political system, bureaucrats are
expected to face weaker political control when they try to share in. The same
holds if the argument is generalized to multiple lines of control in a system of
checks and balances between the executive and the legislature or when the
party control of the executive and legislative branches are divided rather than
uniﬁed.1
2.2 Judicial Independence
A less ambiguous prediction for bureaucratic rents emerges if the separation of
powers is understood to include an independent judiciary. Courts have several
instruments at their disposal to review and revise decisions of politicians and
bureaus and thus effectively inﬂuence policy making. They can rule on the
constitutionality of a statute, on whether actions by regulatory agencies are
consistent with existing law or agencies have followed the appropriate process
in making its decision (Tiller 1998; Hanssen 2000). However, politicians can
override disagreeable rulings and take reprisals. This triggers strategic inter-
action between the court and the other actors. In order to avoid legislative over-
rides, courts have to consider the political interests of the other institutions of
government. Hence, the court can only choose those points in the policy space
from which it is not possible to deviate without reducing the utility of at least
one veto player. Similarly, in administratively implementing a policy, the ex-
ecutive or bureaus anticipate the further evolution of the strategic interaction
(Gely and Spiller 1990).
In general, the existence of an additional independent player, the judiciary,
decreases bureaucratic rents.2 Judicial review restricts the discretion of the
player implementing a statute because the additional player’s ideal point
1. The arguments can, of course, be reﬁned to take into account the many differences within the
two baseline models of representative democracy, with regard to electoral rules, the strength of
regional legislative representation, and so on.
2. Landes and Posner (1975) argue that an independent judiciary can also facilitate rent ex-
traction by the other branches. It immunizes laws from short-run political pressures and thereby
increases the value of legislation sold to interest groups.
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has to be considered.3 It restricts agencies’ discretion in policy implementation
and thus rent-creating possibilities directly in situations in which elected ofﬁ-
cials do not fully control the bureaucracy (Spiller 1992); it restricts bureau-
cratic rents indirectly by reducing overall transfers from the private to the
public sectors in situations of tight political control of bureaus.
The relation between judicial independence and political checks and balan-
ces or political fragmentation is often analyzed applying spatial models. There,
it is only the disalignment of preferences of the other political actors that opens
a set of policy points from which the judiciary can choose without fear of
reversals (Iaryczower et al. 2002). There are, however, also separate institu-
tional factors determining judicial independence. These factors can inﬂuence
both, judges’ desire and ability to challenge the elected ofﬁcials’ decisions,
that is, they shape the constraints on judicial decision making and judges’ po-
litical alignment. Tenure of judges and nomination provisions, for example,
affect the degree to which judges’ preferences are aligned with those of the
relevant political actor. Therefore, depending on these provisions one might
observe a docile judiciary even in a fragmented environment. In contrast, ma-
jority requirements for legislative overrides and transaction costs in negotiat-
ing political deals shield the judiciary apart from the level of political
fragmentation. High transaction costs might make decisions against the gov-
ernment’s interests feasible even in times of political cohesiveness. This latter
aspect is especially important as in this way an independent judiciary can serve
as a means to break up politicians’ and bureaucrats’ cartel against citizens.
2.3 Regulatory Policies
Bureaucratic rents depend on the institutional framework but are ﬁnally created
by speciﬁc regulations and acquired in a speciﬁc form. The main rent-creating
government interventions analyzed in the literature are policies sheltering
ﬁrms from competition (Tullock 1967). Strict regulations function as barriers
to entry and, hence, increase incumbent ﬁrms’ proﬁts. As there is a constant
threat that the rents will be annihilated, interest groups have an incentive to
strike bargains with the bureaucrats (McChesney 1987). Moreover, the higher
the rents created by government intervention, the higher are the incentives for
bureaucrats to engage in malfeasant behavior (Ades and Di Tella 1999). The
level of rents is thus expected to be the higher, the more domestic competition
is hampered by regulatory policies.
2.4 Corruption
A mean to exploit bureaucratic discretion is to require irregular payments or
bribes (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1999). It is, however, an empirical question
whether bureaucrats can acquire rents via corruption or whether gains from
corruption are either dissipated or compensate for lower salaries.
3. Tiller and Spiller (1999) point out that agencies can retain some discretion by strategically
choosing more burdensome regulatory instrument if such choice imposes even greater relative
costs on judicial reversal.
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2.5 Alternative Causes for Utility Premiums in the Bureaucracy and Rent Dissipation
There are many other sources that affect the well-being of government sector
employees. They may, for example, enjoy social respect from their fellow citi-
zens and be intrinsically motivated. Empirically, we take these effects into
account as level effects as there is no obvious reason to believe that they
are systematically related to political control.
Despite the limited political control to bureaucratic rent seeking, it is not
clear whether bureaucrats succeed in capturing any rents at all. The rents
may be dissipated in the process of acquiring and defending them (Buchanan
1980). Therefore, whether and under what conditions bureaucrats are able to
capture rents are ultimately empirical questions.
3. Measurement of Rents in the Public Bureaucracy
The economic idea of a rent is a utility premium an individual can appropriate
due to his or her monopolistic position or informational advantage. We pro-
pose to approximate this utility premium by the relative difference in reported
life satisfaction between public and private employees.4 Behind the score in-
dicated by a respondent lies a cognitive assessment on the extent to which she
judges the overall quality of her life in a favorable way. The measures of
reported subjective well-being passed a series of validation exercises and seem
to signiﬁcantly correlate with true-positive inner feelings (see Frey and Stutzer
2002 for a survey on happiness economics and references to the validation
literature). Focusing on life satisfaction allows us to capture the total net ben-
eﬁts of a position in the public bureaucracy. Thereby, beneﬁts can go beyond
the immediate job, for example, due to advantages on the housing market or
utilization of public services, like education for one’s children, and pension
beneﬁts.5 This ‘‘all-inclusive’’ aspect differentiates our approach from re-
search studying the job satisfaction of public and private sector employees
(Heywood et al. 2002; Clark and Senik 2004).
Our empirical strategy to measure rents in the bureaucracy can be summa-
rized as follows. The utility or life satisfaction increment or decrement from
government sector employment is isolated in a multivariate regression. The
life satisfactionij of individual i living in country j is explained by a dummy
variable that takes on the value 1 if he or she is a bureaucrat and 0 otherwise
and a vector of other personal characteristics Zij along which individuals in the
two sectors might differ from one another and which have an impact on
reported life satisfaction, such as sex, age, education, marital status, type
of neighborhood, and citizenship status. Income, working hours, and occupa-
tion are not included as control variables because these job characteristics may
be important channels through which rents are appropriated. If these job char-
acteristics were held constant, the pervasiveness of any rent in the government
sector would be underestimated. All control variables are transformed into
4. In a competitive market equilibrium with homogenous agents, we expect no difference in
reported life satisfaction between the two sectors and thus no systematic rents.
5. The approach also allows us to capture any disutility fromworking in the public bureaucracy.
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mean deviation form, Zij  Zj. The coefﬁcient of the constant term, b0j, can
thus be interpreted as the life satisfaction of the average individual living in
country j, if he or she were to work in the private sector. In order to allow for
country-speciﬁc effects of government sector employment, as well as for
the control variables on life satisfaction, the regression summarized in the
equation (1) is run for each country j separately:
Life satisfactionij ¼ b0j þ b1jbureaucratij þ b2jðZij  ZjÞ þ eij: ð1Þ
With the estimated coefﬁcients of the microeconometric well-being function,
the percentage difference in life satisfaction due to public employment in
country j, Dj; can be calculated as follows:
Dˆj ¼ bˆ1j=bˆ0j: ð2Þ
Calculating a relative difference within countries cancels out any country- or
culture-speciﬁc response effect. We propose the relative satisfaction differen-
tial Dˆj as a proxy for rents in the public sector. Standard errors (SEs) for the
relative differentials are computed using the delta method.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the ﬁrst two waves of the European
Social Survey (ESS) for 25 European countries (2002/3 and 2004/5) and the
Latinobarometer (LB) for 17 Latin-American countries (waves 1997, 2000,
2001, and 2003). For robustness checks, we also use the Eurobarometer
(EB) with information for 13 European countries (14 waves between 1989
and 1994). Life satisfaction is reported in the ESS using the following ques-
tion: ‘‘All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole
nowadays?’’ Individuals are asked to state their life satisfaction on a scale from
0 (extremely dissatisﬁed) to 10 (extremely satisﬁed). The questions asked in
the other survey series are similar, though responses are elicited on a four-point
scale. In the analysis, the sample is restricted to employed and self-employed
individuals.6 A dummy variable indicates whether an individual is working in
the public bureaucracy. In the ESS, the variable is constructed on the basis of
information about the respondents’ industry. It includes people working in the
public administration, defense, and compulsory social security. There are
39,925 observations from the ESS; 2695 individuals are classiﬁed as bureau-
crats. In the case of the LB and the EB, the variable is constructed on the basis
of information about the respondents’ sector of employment. This categoriza-
tion of the bureaucracy does not only include public administration but also
6. This restriction leads to lower bound estimates of bureaucratic rents for two reasons. First,
former government sector employees usually enjoy exceptionally generous retirement provisions.
Second, public ofﬁcials are often protected from dismissal by special statutes. Hence, former
bureaucrats will be underrepresented among unemployed people. Generous retirement arrange-
ments and greater job security are both likely to be important aspects of bureaucratic rents.
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public sector employment in total. The four waves of the LB used contain
40,539 observations with 6587 public sector employees.
4.2 Measurement of Rents in the Public Bureaucracy
Figure 1 presents the estimated relative utility differentials for the individual
countries. There are four countries with life satisfaction differentials for public
employees that are plus 5% or larger. These are the Czech Republic, Greece,
Paraguay, and Poland. At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries in
which it is more attractive to work in the private sector. For Sweden, Israel, and
Costa Rica the relative differentials are around2% to5%. The relative gaps
in life satisfaction are measured with different degrees of precision, reﬂected in
the conﬁdence interval (CI) for each estimation. These variations in the SEs of
the relative differentials are taken into account in the next step of the analysis.
4.3 Determinants of Rents in the Government Sector
This section tests the determinants of rents discussed in Section 2. Rents in the
government sector, the dependent variable, are taken from our ﬁrst step esti-
mations for single countries. As the dependent variable is measured with un-
equal precision across countries, we have to correct for heteroskedasticity. We
estimate general least squares (GLS) models and use the inverse of the esti-
mated SEs of the relative life satisfaction differentials as weights. We include
a dummy variable for Latin-American countries and the log of GDP per capita
in the baseline speciﬁcation. As economic development is an important sum-
mary measure for a functioning state and economy, this ensures that we study
the determinants of rents for economically comparable countries and are not
just picking up the effect of economic development.
Figure 1. Relative Life Satisfaction Differentials for Europe and Latin America.
Notes: (1) This graph plots estimates for the relative life satisfaction differentials and the corresponding 90% CI; (2) the
SEs of the relative differentials are computed using the delta method. Sources: ESS 2002/3 and 2004/5 and Graham and
Felton (2005) based on LB 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2003.
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4.3.1 Political Checks and Balances. Rents in the government sector are hy-
pothesized to depend on two countervailing effects of the political checks and
balances in a country (see Section 2.1). Regarding political checks and bal-
ances, a basic distinction is between a presidential and a parliamentary system.
Although indicators for this institutional difference are readily available, an
econometric identiﬁcation of the consequences of this speciﬁc institutional dif-
ference is not possible in the sample at hand. The reason is that Latin-American
countries adopted presidential systems, whereas European countries mainly
chose parliamentary systems. However, it is possible to study the political
checks and balances emerging from an alignment or disalignment of the po-
litical preferences of the executive and the legislature. We construct a variable
based on data from Henisz (2002). Alignment takes on a value 1 if the exec-
utive is aligned with at least one legislative chamber and 0 otherwise. Table 1
shows that the relative life satisfaction differential is 3.6 percentage points
larger in countries where the executive and the legislature are dominated
by the same party. However, the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3.2 Judicial Independence. For judicial checks, we estimate large negative
effects on the proxy for rents. The ﬁrst variable measures judicial indepen-
dence, or the absence of interference by the government or parties in disputes.
The second measures the extent to which a trusted legal framework exists for
private business to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations.
Both measures are based on the perceptions of business executives about the
judicial system in the country they operate (Gwartney and Lawson 2004).7 The
decrement of the differential for an increase of the indicators by 1 standard
deviation (SD) amounts to 3.2 percentage points for judicial independence
and 3.6 percentage points for impartial courts. Although the degree of judicial
independence depends on the political checks and balances, it is not fully de-
termined by them. Therefore, we take both institutional aspects jointly into
account in the estimation equation. Judicial independence is still related with
lower rents in the public bureaucracy. The positive effect for alignment is now
statistically signiﬁcant. If political checks and balances are undermined by an
executive and legislature that are dominated by the same party, rents are es-
timated to be higher, ceteris paribus.
4.3.3 Regulatory Policies. Columns VI and VII in Table 1 show that rents in
the public sector are systematically related to policies protecting ﬁrms from
competition. We use two variables based on business executives’ perceptions
(1) on how easy it is in general to start a new business and (2) on the prevalence
of price controls (Gwartney and Lawson 2004). We ﬁnd that rents are lower
when it is easier to start a business and higher when price controls are
more widespread. A change of the former indicator by 1 SD is related to
7. All indices from Gwartney and Lawson (2004) are rescaled such that they take on values
between 0 and 10 with 0 meaning, for example, the least independent.
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Table 1. Checks and Balances and Rents in the Public Bureaucracy
Dependent variable
Life satisfaction differential I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Political checks and balances
Alignment executive and legislature 0.036
(0.023)
0.044(*)
(0.022)
0.045*
(0.021)
Judiciary
Judicial independence 0.006(*)
(0.003)
0.007*
(0.003)
Impartial courts 0.009*
(0.003)
0.010**
(0.003)
Regulation
Ease of starting business 0.007(*)
(0.004)
Price controls 0.005*
(0.002)
Corruption
Irregular payments 0.014**
(0.004)
Control variables
Log(GDP per capita) 0.007
(0.010)
0.009
(0.011)
0.014
(0.011)
0.006
(0.011)
0.010
(0.011)
0.003
(0.010)
4  104
(0.009)
0.021(*)
(0.011)
1(Latin America) 0.007
(0.016)
0.017
(0.017)
0.019
(0.016)
0.019
(0.016)
0.021
(0.016)
0.015
(0.017)
0.007
(0.016)
0.015
(0.015)
Constant 0.044
(0.098)
0.040
(0.103)
0.060
(0.099)
0.042
(0.100)
0.059
(0.095)
0.026
(0.098)
0.003
(0.097)
0.222(*)
(0.114)
Number of observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R2 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.08 0.11 0.25
GLS estimations; **p  0.01, *0.01< p  0.05, and (*)0.05 < p  0.1; SE in parentheses. Sources: ESS 2002/3 and 2004/5, Graham and Felton (2005) based on LB 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003; Henisz (2002);
Heston et al. (2002); and Gwartney and Lawson (2004).
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a 3.8-percentage point change of the relative life satisfaction differential; the
respective ﬁgure for the latter indicator is 2.1 percentage points.
4.3.4 Corruption. Whether public employees acquire rents through corrup-
tion is empirically studied in column VIII of Table 1. The pervasiveness of
corruption in a country is measured by an indicator that speciﬁcally captures
bureaucratic corruption. It is based on a survey measuring perceptions of busi-
ness executives about the frequency of irregular, additional payments, con-
nected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications (Gwartney
and Lawson 2004). We ﬁnd a close positive association between corruption
and bureaucratic rents for the sample considered. Figure 2 visualizes the pos-
itive statistical association.
An increase of the corruption index by 1 SD entails an increment in the life
satisfaction differential of 4.7 percentage points, a magnitude comparable to
the difference in the level of rents between Sweden on the one hand and Brazil
on the other hand.
We tested the sensitivity of our results in a series of robustness checks.8 The
results are very similar for a sample with less European countries, based on
a combination of the LB with the EB instead of the ESS. Moreover, the
Figure 2. Corruption and Rents in the Public Bureaucracy.
Notes: (1) GLS estimation; (2) shaded area is 95% CI; (3) life satisfaction differentials are corrected for log(GDP per
capita) and separate constants for Europe and Latin America, respectively. Sources: ESS 2002/3 and 2004/5; Graham
and Felton (2005) based on LB 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2003; Heston et al. (2002); and Gwartney and Lawson (2004).
8. For the sake of brevity, the results are only reported in the unpublished data appendix (avail-
able on request).
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qualitative results do not depend on the weighting of observations. The relative
life satisfaction differentials based on the EB are estimated with a higher pre-
cision compared to the ESS as the number of observations and the number of
sampled bureaucrats exceed those of the ESS. Both robustness tests are, there-
fore, reassuring that the results are not driven by a combination of both im-
precisely measured life satisfaction differentials and the weighting correction
for heteroskedasticity.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this article, a new measure is introduced to directly approach the idea of
rents in the public bureaucracy: the difference in life satisfaction between peo-
ple working in the government sector and people working in the private sector
within a country. We ﬁnd that the relative advantage of working in the gov-
ernment sector differs substantially across countries. In accordance with the-
ories on rent seeking, we ﬁnd that the differences in rents can be partly
accounted for by country differences in regulatory policies and differences
in institutional constraints. Our proxy measure of rents also correlates with
a widely used perceived corruption index. The fact that rents positively cor-
relate with corruption shows that the beneﬁts acquired through corruption are
neither completely dissipated nor do they compensate for potentially lower
regular salaries in the government sector.
Our new methodological approach can be applied to study other forms of
rents outside of the government sector, where market imperfections have to be
assessed. For example, it can be studied to what extent people exposed to en-
vironmental disadvantages are compensated on the housing and labor market.
The approach can also be applied to study groups (e.g., minorities or women)
that are potentially discriminated on the labor market. More generally, our
analysis demonstrates that life satisfaction data can be applied to validate the-
ories in law, economics, and politics in a new way.
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